Essl, Andrea; von Bieberstein, Frauke; Kosfeld, Michael; Kröll, Markus (2023). Social preferences and sales performance. Journal of economics & management strategy, 32(4), pp. 882-905. Wiley 10.1111/jems.12523
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We use an incentivized experimental game to uncover heterogeneity in social preferences among salespeople in a large Austrian retail chain. Our results show that the majority of agents take the welfare of others into account but a significant fraction reveal selfish behavior. Matching individual behavior in the game with firm data on sales performance shows that agents with social preferences achieve a significantly higher revenue per customer. However, at the same time, they achieve fewer sales per day. Both effects offset each other, so that the overall association with total sales revenue becomes insignificant. Our findings highlight the nuanced role of selfish versus social preferences in sales contexts with important implications for economic research.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Organization and Human Resource Management > Organisation 03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Organization and Human Resource Management |
UniBE Contributor: |
Essl, Andrea, von Bieberstein, Frauke |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics 600 Technology > 650 Management & public relations |
ISSN: |
1058-6407 |
Publisher: |
Wiley |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Andrea Essl |
Date Deposited: |
05 May 2023 16:17 |
Last Modified: |
21 Oct 2023 00:12 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1111/jems.12523 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
social preferences, trust game, sales performance |
BORIS DOI: |
10.48350/182353 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/182353 |
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