Emons, Winand (October 2002). Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders (Diskussionsschriften 02-11). Bern: Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut
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First we show that for wealth-constrained agents who may commit an act twice the optimal sanctions are the offender’s entire wealth for the first and zero for the second crime. Then we ask the question whether this decreasing sanction scheme is subgame perfect (time consistent), i.e., does a rent-seeking government stick to this sanction scheme after the first crime has occurred. If the benefit and/or the harm from the crime are not too large, this is indeed the case; otherwise, equal sanctions for both crimes are optimal.
Item Type: |
Working Paper |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics 03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics > Institute of Economics > Economic Theory |
UniBE Contributor: |
Emons, Winand |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
Series: |
Diskussionsschriften |
Publisher: |
Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Aline Lehnherr |
Date Deposited: |
11 Jun 2020 16:19 |
Last Modified: |
23 Jul 2024 03:10 |
JEL Classification: |
D82, K41, K42 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.143989 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/143989 |
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