Muratov, Oleg (2023). Mapping an information design game into an all-pay auction (In Press). Review of economic design Springer 10.1007/s10058-023-00334-w
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I formally establish the existence of a mapping between a class of information design games with multiple senders and a class of all-pay auctions. I fully characterize this mapping and show how to use it to find equilibria in the information design game. The mapping allows for a straightforward comparative statics analysis of equilibria in the latter class of games. I use it to study the effect of the tie-breaking rule on the distributions of posteriors and the receiver’s payoff.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Economics |
UniBE Contributor: |
Muratov, Oleg |
Subjects: |
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
ISSN: |
1434-4742 |
Publisher: |
Springer |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Dino Collalti |
Date Deposited: |
21 Jul 2023 09:16 |
Last Modified: |
21 Jul 2023 09:25 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1007/s10058-023-00334-w |
BORIS DOI: |
10.48350/184970 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/184970 |
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