Beisbart, Claus; Bovens, Luc (2013). Minimizing the Threat of a Positive Majority Deficit in Two-tier Voting Systems with Equipopulous Units. Public choice, 154(1-2), pp. 75-94. Springer 10.1007/s11127-011-9810-2
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The mean majority deficit in a two-tier voting system is a function of the partition of the population. We derive a new square-root rule: For odd-numbered population sizes and equipopulous units the mean majority deficit is maximal when the member size of the units in the partition is close to the square root of the population size. Furthermore, within the partitions into roughly equipopulous units, partitions with small even numbers of units or small even-sized units yield high mean majority deficits. We discuss the implications for the winner-takes-all system in the US Electoral College.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
|---|---|
Division/Institute: |
06 Faculty of Humanities > Department of Art and Cultural Studies > Institute of Philosophy |
UniBE Contributor: |
Beisbart, Claus |
Subjects: |
100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy > 170 Ethics 300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 320 Political science |
ISSN: |
0048-5829 |
Publisher: |
Springer |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Claus Beisbart |
Date Deposited: |
17 Apr 2014 16:04 |
Last Modified: |
05 Dec 2022 14:32 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1007/s11127-011-9810-2 |
Uncontrolled Keywords: |
Two-tier voting system, Mean majority deficit, Voting power, Electoral College, Sensitivity, Majoritarianism |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.49192 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/49192 |
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