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Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (2019). Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs. Theory and Decision, 87(3), pp. 341-363. Springer 10.1007/s11238-019-09709-4
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (2016). Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts. International review of law and economics, 47, pp. 16-23. Elsevier 10.1016/j.irle.2016.03.004
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (January 2016). Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs (Discussion Papers 16-01). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (October 2013). Why Plaintiffs’ Attorneys use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts (Discussion Papers 13-06). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (2013). The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony. In: Miceli, Thomas; Baker, Matthew (eds.) Research Handbook on the Economic Models of Law (pp. 175-192). Edward Elgar
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (2012). Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(4), pp. 352-360. Elsevier 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.01.004
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (September 2009). Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (Discussion Papers 09-04). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (December 2008). Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal (Discussion Papers 08-05). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (January 2007). Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures (Discussion Papers 07-02). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (2007). Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs. The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures. Journal of law, economics, & organization, 25(1), pp. 134-156. Cary, N.C.: Oxford University Press 10.1093/jleo/ewm046
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (June 2005). The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony (Discussion Papers 05-06). Bern: Department of Economics
