When social accounts work: evidence from ultimatum games

Lammers, Frauke; Hack, Andreas (2008). When social accounts work: evidence from ultimatum games. Current Research in Social Psychology, 13(14), pp. 161-174. University of Iowa

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This paper examines the mitigating effect of social accounts on retaliatory behavior in a miniultimatum game setting. Results from games with 108 German high school students support the hypothesis that an ex ante informational and sensitive message can decrease an individuals’ negative perception of an unfair offer and increase the acceptance of the outcome. Furthermore, the moderating effect of gender on retaliatory behavior is investigated. We show that an informational and sensitive message makes more of a difference for women in accepting unfair distributions than it does for men.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Organization and Human Resource Management
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Organization and Human Resource Management > Organisation
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Organization and Human Resource Management > Human Resource Management

UniBE Contributor:

von Bieberstein, Frauke and Hack, Andreas

Subjects:

600 Technology > 650 Management & public relations

ISSN:

1088-7423

Publisher:

University of Iowa

Language:

English

Submitter:

Andreas Hack

Date Deposited:

17 Jul 2014 11:47

Last Modified:

15 Aug 2018 14:44

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.42417

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/42417

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