Spontaneous Giving under Structural Inequality: Intuition Promotes Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas

Lotz, Sebastian (2015). Spontaneous Giving under Structural Inequality: Intuition Promotes Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas. PLoS ONE, 10(7), pp. 1-9. Public Library of Science 10.1371/journal.pone.0131562

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The present research investigates the role of intuitive mental processing on cooperation in experimental games involving structural inequality. Results from an experiment using conceptual priming to induce intuitive mental processing provide the first evidence that cooperation is promoted by intuition in an asymmetric context that distributes the gains from cooperation unequally among a group. Therefore, the results extend our understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of human cooperation by demonstrating the robustness of intuitive cooperation in games involving structural inequality regarding asymmetric gains from cooperation. Additionally, the results provide the first successful conceptual replication of the intuition-cooperation link using conceptual priming, therefore also contributing to the debate about the validity of previous research in other contexts. Taken together, the present research contributes to the literature on psychological and institutional mechanisms that promote cooperation.

Item Type:

Journal Article (Original Article)

Division/Institute:

03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Organization and Human Resource Management > Organisation

UniBE Contributor:

Berger, Sebastian

Subjects:

600 Technology > 650 Management & public relations
300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics

ISSN:

1932-6203

Publisher:

Public Library of Science

Language:

English

Submitter:

Claudia Probst

Date Deposited:

04 Jul 2017 16:08

Last Modified:

04 Jul 2017 16:08

Publisher DOI:

10.1371/journal.pone.0131562

BORIS DOI:

10.7892/boris.94973

URI:

https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/94973

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