Lotz, Sebastian (2015). Spontaneous Giving under Structural Inequality: Intuition Promotes Cooperation in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas. PLoS ONE, 10(7), pp. 1-9. Public Library of Science 10.1371/journal.pone.0131562
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The present research investigates the role of intuitive mental processing on cooperation in experimental games involving structural inequality. Results from an experiment using conceptual priming to induce intuitive mental processing provide the first evidence that cooperation is promoted by intuition in an asymmetric context that distributes the gains from cooperation unequally among a group. Therefore, the results extend our understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of human cooperation by demonstrating the robustness of intuitive cooperation in games involving structural inequality regarding asymmetric gains from cooperation. Additionally, the results provide the first successful conceptual replication of the intuition-cooperation link using conceptual priming, therefore also contributing to the debate about the validity of previous research in other contexts. Taken together, the present research contributes to the literature on psychological and institutional mechanisms that promote cooperation.
Item Type: |
Journal Article (Original Article) |
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Division/Institute: |
03 Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences > Department of Business Management > Institute of Organization and Human Resource Management > Organisation |
UniBE Contributor: |
Berger, Sebastian |
Subjects: |
600 Technology > 650 Management & public relations 300 Social sciences, sociology & anthropology > 330 Economics |
ISSN: |
1932-6203 |
Publisher: |
Public Library of Science |
Language: |
English |
Submitter: |
Claudia Probst |
Date Deposited: |
04 Jul 2017 16:08 |
Last Modified: |
04 Apr 2024 03:34 |
Publisher DOI: |
10.1371/journal.pone.0131562 |
BORIS DOI: |
10.7892/boris.94973 |
URI: |
https://boris.unibe.ch/id/eprint/94973 |
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