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Emons, Winand; Lenhard, Severin Jean-Jacques (2022). The Economics of Advice (Unpublished)
Emons, Winand; Lenhard, Severin (July 2020). Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions (Discussion Papers). Department of Economics
Emons, Winand (October 2018). The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion (Discussion Papers 18-16). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (January 2016). Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs (Discussion Papers 16-01). Bern: Department of Economics
Anderson, Lisa R.; DeAngelo, Gregory; Emons, Winand; Freeborn, Beth; Lang, Hannes (April 2015). Penalty Structures and Deterrance in a Two-Stage Model: Experimental Evidence (Discussion Papers 15-05). Bern: Department of Economics
Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio (July 2014). Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence (Discussion Papers 14-05). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (October 2013). Why Plaintiffs’ Attorneys use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts (Discussion Papers 13-06). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand (January 2010). Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians (Discussion Papers 10-01). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (September 2009). Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Testimony (Discussion Papers 09-04). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (December 2008). Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal (Discussion Papers 08-05). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (January 2007). Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures (Discussion Papers 07-02). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand (December 2006). Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets (Discussion Papers 06-05). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (June 2005). The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony (Discussion Papers 05-06). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand (December 2004). Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees (Discussion Papers 04-19). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand; Garoupa, Nuno (May 2004). The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees (Discussion Papers 04-07). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand (May 2004). Conditional versus Contingent Fees (Discussion Papers 04-09). Bern: Department of Economics
Emons, Winand (October 2002). Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders (Diskussionsschriften 02-11). Bern: Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut
Emons, Winand; Sheldon, George (April 2002). The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model (Diskussionsschriften 02-02). Bern: Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut
Emons, Winand (December 2001). A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders (Diskussionsschriften 01-04). Bern: Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut
Emons, Winand (September 2001). Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony (Diskussionsschriften 01-03). Bern: Universität Bern Volkswirtschaftliches Institut
Emons, Winand; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Muehlheusser, Gerd (2024). Symposium on Credence Goods. Editorial Preface. Journal of institutional and theoretical economics, 180(1), p. 1. Mohr Siebeck 10.1628/jite-2023-0037
Emons, Winand; Lenhard, Severin (2023). Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Negotiations. American law and economic review, 24(2), pp. 589-613. Oxford University Press 10.1093/aler/ahac008
Emons, Winand (2020). The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 70, p. 102619. Elsevier 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102619
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (2019). Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs. Theory and Decision, 87(3), pp. 341-363. Springer 10.1007/s11238-019-09709-4
Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio (2018). Optimal Leniency Programs When Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence. Review of industrial organization, 52(3), pp. 403-427. Springer 10.1007/s11151-017-9586-8
Emons, Winand (2017). Legal Fees and Lawyers’ Compensation. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 3: Public Law and Legal Institutions 3 (pp. 247-258). Oxford: Oxford University Press 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199684250.013.42
Anderson, Lisa R.; DeAngelo, Gregory; Emons, Winand; Freeborn, Beth; Lang, Hannes (2017). PENALTY STRUCTURES AND DETERRENCE IN A TWO-STAGE MODEL: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE. Economic inquiry, 55(4), pp. 1833-1867. Wiley 10.1111/ecin.12464
Emons, Winand (November 2016). Contingent Fees – Mehr Anreize bei Anwaltshonoraren. Die Volkswirtschaft: Plattform für Wirtschaftspolitik, 89(11), p. 39. SECO
Emons, Winand (15 October 2016). Nobelpreis für Hart und Holmström - Ausgezeichnete Verträge. NZZ Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 237(241), p. 33. Neue Zürcher Zeitung
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (2016). Why Plaintiffs' Attorneys Use Contingent and Defense Attorneys Fixed Fee Contracts. International review of law and economics, 47, pp. 16-23. Elsevier 10.1016/j.irle.2016.03.004
Emons, Winand (2013). Incentive-Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 169(4), pp. 605-620. Mohr Siebeck 10.1628/093245613X671869
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (2013). The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony. In: Miceli, Thomas; Baker, Matthew (eds.) Research Handbook on the Economic Models of Law (pp. 175-192). Edward Elgar
Emons, Winand; Fluet, Claude (2012). Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising of Quality. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30(4), pp. 352-360. Elsevier 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.01.004
Emons, Winand; et al., (eds.) (2012). The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. De Gruyter
Emons, Winand (ed.) (2011). Review of Law and Economics. BePress
Emons, Winand (ed.) (2011). International Review of Law and Economics. Elsevier
Emons, Winand; et al., (eds.) (2011). The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. BePress
Emons, Winand (ed.) (2011). Asian Journal of Law and Economics. De Gruyter
Emons, Winand (ed.) (2010). Review of Law and Economics. BePress
Emons, Winand; et al., (eds.) (2010). The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. BePress
Emons, Winand (ed.) (2010). Asian Journal of Law and Economics. De Gruyter
Emons, Winand (2009). Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 9(1), pp. 1-19. Berlin: De Gruyter 10.2202/1935-1682.2076
Emons, Winand; Sheldon, George (2009). The market for used cars. New evidence of the lemons phenomenon. Applied economics, 41(22), pp. 2867-2885. Abingdon, UK: Routledge 10.1080/00036840802277332
Emons, Winand (ed.) (2009). Review of Law and Economics. BePress
Emons, Winand; et al., (eds.) (2009). The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. BePress
Emons, Winand (2006). Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees. American law and economics review, 8(1), pp. 20-32. Oxford: Oxford University Press 10.1093/aler/ahj002
Emons, Winand (2006). US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees: Agency Problems and the Supply of Legal Services. Managerial and decision economics, 27(5), pp. 379-385. Chichester: Wiley